A recent discovery by cybersecurity experts has brought to light a new malware campaign centered around seven npm packages. The campaign, identified by the Socket Threat Research Team, is orchestrated by a threat actor known as dino_reborn. It employs a combination of cloaking tools, anti-analysis measures, and fake crypto-exchange CAPTCHAs to differentiate between potential victims and security researchers.
The malicious campaign consists of six packages containing nearly identical 39 KB malware samples, along with a seventh package responsible for creating a facade webpage. These packages, namely signals-embed, dsidospsodlks, applicationooks21, application-phskck, integrator-filescrypt2025, integrator-2829, and integrator-2830, were active until they were taken down upon security requests.
The operation of this campaign involved each malicious package executing automatically through an Immediately-Invoked Function Expression (IIFE) to collect detailed information about the visiting device. Thirteen data points, including user agent and language settings, were gathered and sent through a proxy to the Adspect API, a traffic-cloaking service.
Based on the assessment by the Adspect API, if the visitor was deemed to be a security researcher, they would see a “white page” made up of static assets. On the other hand, if identified as a victim, a fake CAPTCHA branded with standx.com, jup.ag, or uniswap.org would appear. Subsequently, the CAPTCHA would redirect the victim to a malicious URL provided by Adspect after a short delay.
The communication between the malware packages and the facade webpage utilized shared container IDs. While signals-embed constructed the white page visible to researchers, fallback code within the malware would generate a branded Offlido page in case of network failure. Anti-analysis features were also implemented to hinder attempts to inspect the code, such as disabling right-click, F12, Ctrl+U, and detecting open DevTools which triggered a page reload.
Key indicators of this campaign include the use of /adspect-proxy.php and /adspect-file.php paths, JavaScript that prevents user interactions, and dynamic redirects associated with Adspect stream IDs.
Looking ahead, Socket researchers cautioned that this campaign blends open source distribution with tactics commonly seen in malvertising operations. With Adspect generating fresh redirect URLs for each request, the payloads can rapidly change. They advised defenders to remain vigilant against abuse of Adspect-style cloaking and proxy infrastructure in browser-executed open source packages, which may resurface with new brand identities and package names.
In light of these developments, web teams are advised to treat unexpected scripts that disable user interactions or transmit detailed client fingerprints to unfamiliar PHP endpoints as immediate red flags. Network defenders should also monitor for the presence of /adspect-proxy.php and /adspect-file.php paths across domains, as these serve as reliable indicators of this threat actor’s toolkit.
