The European Union (EU) has strict rules in place for stablecoins issued by electronic-money institutions, requiring them to keep a certain percentage of their reserves in commercial-bank deposits. This requirement is set to increase to 60% for significant tokens. However, Britain has taken a different approach by excluding commercial-bank deposits from backing systemic sterling stablecoin reserves.
Recently, the European System of Central Banks, which includes the European Central Bank and EU national central banks, has recommended replacing the compulsory bank-deposit share under the Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation with minimum reserve percentages in assets maturing within one and five working days. This proposal aims to change where issuers must keep redemption money, while still upholding MiCA’s existing requirements.
In contrast, the Bank of England has set a consultation deadline for its draft systemic stablecoin Code of Practice, which prohibits commercial-bank backing due to financial, operational, and contagion risks. The Bank plans to finalize the code by the end of 2026.
While the EU and Britain have different approaches to stablecoin reserves, they share a common concern about the risks that banks pose to stablecoin reserves. Keeping reserves in banks can create a connection between stablecoin reserves and financial stress within the banking system.
The issue arises from the fact that if a bank fails, it can impact the confidence in stablecoin reserves. Conversely, if holders rush to redeem their stablecoins, the issuer may withdraw large deposits from banks to repay them, potentially causing a run on the bank.
The proposed recommendation by the European System of Central Banks would focus on short-maturity assets, aiming to reduce the reliance on commercial-bank deposits. In comparison, the Bank of England’s policy allows for up to 70% in short-term UK government debt and 30% in central-bank deposits with no interest.
Both approaches aim to ensure that stablecoin reserves are accessible and can quickly be turned into cash when needed. While the EU may need legislative changes to remove the deposit requirements, Britain’s policy already includes financial risk reserves and a central-bank liquidity backstop to address these concerns.
Ultimately, the comparison between the EU and Britain’s stablecoin policies highlights the importance of ensuring that stablecoin reserves are secure and readily available for redemption. By addressing the risks associated with commercial-bank deposits, both regions are working towards creating a safer and more resilient stablecoin ecosystem.
